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Abstract
New air traffic management (ATM) concepts for departure and landing on busy airports
might have a major impact on capacity if the wake vortex induced risks are better understood.
The present wake vortex separation standards for the use of a single runway are often limiting
capacity too much. To give ATM concept developers feedback with respect to the safety of
new ATM concepts, a novel probabilistic methodology is under development for the
assessment of wake vortex induced accident risks. The results of the safety assessment give
insight in critical ATM design issues and thereby well-founded advice can be given on
improvement of the design of the ATM concept.
The probabilistic wake vortex induced accident risk assessment is based on recent
progress in wake vortex research. Commonly accepted models for wake vortex evolution and
wake encounter have been adapted and integrated through a stochastic modeling and analysis
based accident risk assessment methodology.
This paper outlines this probabilistic wake vortex induced accident risk assessment
methodology and illustrates its initial application to the case of multiple aircraft landing on a
single runway.
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Abstract
New air traffic management (ATM) concepts for departure and landing on busy airports
might have a major impact on capacity if the wake vortex induced risks are better understood.
The present wake vortex separation standards for the use of a single runway are often limiting
capacity too much. To give ATM concept developers feedback with respect to the safety of
new ATM concepts, a novel probabilistic methodology is under development for the
assessment of wake vortex induced accident risks. The results of the safety assessment give
insight in critical ATM design issues and thereby well-founded advice can be given on
improvement of the design of the ATM concept.
The probabilistic wake vortex induced accident risk assessment is based on recent
progress in wake vortex research. Commonly accepted models for wake vortex evolution and
wake encounter have been adapted and integrated through a stochastic modeling and analysis
based accident risk assessment methodology.
This paper outlines this probabilistic wake vortex induced accident risk assessment
methodology and illustrates its initial application to the case of multiple aircraft landing on a
single runway.
I. Introduction
New ATM concepts for departure and landing on busy airports with multiple runways
might have a major impact on capacity if the wake vortex induced risks are better understood.
In particular, there is a need for identifying the conditions under which the present wake
vortex separation standards would limit capacity too much. In Ref. [1], an initial probabilistic
methodology has been developed to assess such safe separations in case of a single runway.
There are several reasons why there is a need to extend this initial methodology, e.g.:
1. To guide and incorporate ongoing developments in wake vortex induced risk modeling;
2. To generalize its application from a single runway to closely spaced runways;
3. To allow the evaluation of advanced ground and/or airborne procedures that make use of
wake vortex detection and decision support systems;
4. To allow the evaluation of safe separation standards for new aerodynamic aircraft
designs;
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5. To integrate it with a methodology that assesses risk of collision with other aircraft in the
air or on the ground.
These reasons provided a clear motivation to extend the accident risk assessment
methodology to enable the determination of safe separations for advanced ATM [2]. This
extension resulted in a complementary and novel probabilistic methodology for the
assessment of wake vortex induced accident and incident risks.
The aim of this paper is to show how the accident risk assessment methodology can be
used to support the assessment of wake vortex induced accident and incident risks, and how
advantage is taken from recent progress in wake vortex research, e.g. Refs. [1], [3], and [4].
The methodology is also illustrated for an example of a medium-weighted aircraft landing
behind a heavy-weighted aircraft on a (single) runway.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the risk assessment methodology
and the supporting tool sets. In Section III the wake vortex specific models are explained in
more detail. Section IV illustrates the application to the specific single runway example.
Section V draws conclusions.
II. Risk Assessment Methodology
As the basis for the development of a wake vortex risk induced assessment approach use
is made of a stochastic analysis and modeling approach based accident risk assessment
methodology for advanced ATM operations [2]. This methodology supports the spiral
development cycle that is part of modern safety case building for new ATM operational
concepts, [5], [6]. Such a cycle is typically of the form:
A. Design of an ATM operational concept.
B. Assessment of the ATM concept, resulting in a cost-benefit overview.
C. Detailed analysis of the assessment results, which results in recommendations for
improvements of the ATM concept.
D. Review ATM concept development strategy and plan.
E. Back to A: adapted and/or more detailed ATM concept design using the results from C
resulting in a new or optimized ATM concept.
This stochastic analysis and modeling based accident risk assessment methodology has
been developed to provide designers of advanced ATM with safety feedback following on a
(re)design cycle and is referred to as Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer
(TOPAZ), see Fig. 1.
During the assessment cycle four stages are sequentially conducted:
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1. Stage 1: Identification of operation and hazards (upper box in Fig. 1). Information about
nominal and non-nominal behavior of the ATM concept or procedure is gathered, through
hazard identification sessions with a variety of experts.
2. Stage 2: Mathematical modeling (lower right box in Fig. 1). A stochastic dynamical
model of the operation is developed that incorporates both all the nominal and all the non-
nominal events of the operation. During this stage, all model assumptions made are
systematically specified.
3. Stage 3: Accident risk assessment (middle box in Fig. 1). The mathematical model of
stage 2 supports an effective procedure, consisting of a number of steps to be followed, to
quantify the accident risk. In addition to such numerical approach, a qualitative analysis
of the model assumptions is performed.
4. Stage 4: Feedback to operational experts (lower left box in Fig. 1). The results of the
quantitative safety assessment are fed back to and discussed with the designers and
operational experts, who can use the results to redesign or optimize their proposed ATM
design if necessary.
For the second and third stages use can be made of the following TOPAZ tools:
1. SIMULATOR is a tool set used to specify and implement the mathematical model and to
subsequently run Monte Carlo simulations with that implementation. SIMULATOR can
simulate all aspects of operations, including the stochastic non-nominal aspects.
2. COLLIR is a methodology and tool set that supports the evaluation of collision risks in
the terminal manoeuvring area (TMA) and en route.
3. TAXIR is a methodology and tool set that supports the evaluation of accident risks at the
airport.
4. CRITER is a risk criteria framework that is needed to judge the acceptability of the risks
that are assessed by COLLIR, WAVIR and TAXIR.
The methodological parts of COLLIR, WAVIR and TAXIR incorporate the evaluation of
statistical data that are obtained either through empirical data collections or through Monte
Carlo simulations (e.g., SIMULATOR). One should be aware that for each of the tools
further extensions are ongoing at the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR.
-8-
NLR-TP-2000-280
Fi
gu
re
 
1:
 T
O
PA
Z 
ac
ci
de
nt
 
ris
k a
ss
es
sm
en
t c
yc
le
.
*
 
Ai
rc
re
w
 o
ve
rlo
ad
*
 
C
re
w
 h
in
dr
an
ce
*
 
Pi
lo
t r
ea
ct
io
n 
to
o 
la
te
*
 
Pi
lo
t i
gn
or
es
 c
on
fli
ct
*
 
C
re
w
 d
is
ag
re
em
en
t
*
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 v
is
ib
ili
ty
*
 
.
.
.
A
0
A
irc
ra
ft
m
is
si
on
A
2
Pi
lo
ts
 S
ki
ll
A
3
Pi
lo
t N
ot
Fl
yi
ng
A
4
Pi
lo
t F
ly
in
g
A
10
/T
 lo
ca
l
A
1
Fl
ig
ht
pl
an
ai
rc
ra
ft
A
6
D
is
pl
ay
ai
rc
ra
ft
A
14
C
P
A
15
FP
CM
 o
th
er
A
16
FP
CM
 o
w
n
A
11
ST
C
D
&
R
A
17
Fl
ig
ht
pl
an
da
ta
 o
th
er
A
12
A
D
S-
B
ai
rc
ra
ft
A
9
A
9
A
9
A
9
A
1
A
0
A
irc
ra
ft
m
is
si
on
A
2
Pi
lo
ts
 S
ki
ll
A
3
Pi
lo
t N
ot
Fl
yi
ng
A
4
Pi
lo
t F
ly
in
g
A
10
/T
 lo
ca
l
A
1
Fl
ig
ht
pl
an
ai
rc
ra
ft
A
6
D
is
pl
ay
ai
rc
ra
ft
A
14
C
P
A
15
FP
CM
 o
th
er
A
16
FP
CM
 o
w
n
A
11
ST
C
D
&
R
A
17
Fl
ig
ht
pl
an
da
ta
 o
th
er
A
12
A
D
S-
B
ai
rc
ra
ft
A
9
A
9
A
9
A
9
A
1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
10
-
11
10
-
10
10
-
9
10
-
8
10
-
7
10
-
6
10
-
5
10
-
4
10
-
3
10
-
2
10
-
1
R
is
k
v
s.
ro
u
te
sp
a
c
in
g
Sp
a
c
in
g
S
(in
km
)
Risk(inaccidents/flightho
ur)
*
w
it
ho
u
tA
T
C
o
cu
r
re
n
tA
T
C
+
In
iti
a
lF
re
e
Fl
ig
ht
e
qu
ip
pe
d
-
T
L
S
(E
u
ro
c
o
n
tr
o
l)
x
Ta
r
ge
t
F
re
e
F
lig
ht
eq
u
ip
pe
d
ta
rg
e
t
-
 
 
TL
S 
(E
ur
oc
on
tro
l)
*
 
 
 
w
ith
ou
t A
TC
o
  
 c
u
rr
e
n
t 
A
TC
+
  
in
iti
al
 F
re
e 
Fl
ig
ht
x
  
 e
xt
en
de
d 
Fr
e
e
 F
lig
ht
[
]
(
)
{
}
∑∑
∑ ∫
≠
=
⋅
=
=
ℜ
i
i
j
l
T
l
ij t
l
ij t
ij
T
H
H
P
dt
t
0
,0
*
*
21
κ
κ
κ
κ
ϕ
-9-
NLR-TP-2000-280
III. Wake Vortex Risk Assessment
A.  Overview
For the assessment of the wake vortex induced accident and incident risks the following
tools are used:
1. flight path evolution (in SIMULATOR),
2. wake vortex evolution and decay (in WAVIR),
3. wake encounter model (in WAVIR),
4. integration and risk evaluation model (in WAVIR), and
5. risk criteria framework (in CRITER).
These tools are described in Sections III.B-III.E, together with references that give more
details about the models used.
B.  Flight Path Evolution
The flight path evolution model yields the following stochastic variables:
1. the lateral and vertical coordinates of the leader if its longitudinal co-ordinate x is given,
2. the period of time elapsed between the generation of the wake and the time instant that
the trailer has longitudinal position x, and
3. the lateral and vertical coordinates of the trailer when it has longitudinal coordinate x.
The flight path evolution model is a stochastic dynamical model, which incorporates the
established International Civil Aviation Organization-Collision Risk Model (ICAO-CRM) [7]
as baseline, and which has been further developed to handle the dependent usage of closely
spaced runways [8].
The flight path evolution model is represented in a form [9] that allows a straightforward
extension of the SIMULATOR tool set for new air and/or ground procedures and advanced
vortex detection and decision-support systems.
C.  Wake Vortex Evolution and Decay
The wake vortex evolution model yields the position and strength stochastic variables of
the wake vortex at any time instant after the generation of the wake vortex. The wake vortex
evolution model is mainly based on Refs. [3] and [4]. The models in the latter papers have
been probabilitized and they have been completed for application to the wake vortex induced
risk assessment.
This wake vortex evolution model is able to take into account probabilistic models for
stratification, atmospheric turbulence, ground effects (rebound, divergence), and crosswind
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(advection, shear). It can also handle probabilistic models for the vertical and horizontal wind
fields and their impact on wake evolution.
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Figure 2: Observed vortex residence time distribution for B-747 vortices with initial height
30 metres (solid line), initial strength of the wake of 600 m2/s and wingspan 60 metres (from
Fig. 2 in Ref. [10]); Rayleigh density adopted in WAVIR for the vortex bursting or linking
period (dashed line).
During many landings, the trailer aircraft does not meet any wake vortex. In the wake
vortex evolution model, two possible causes are distinguished:
1. the wake vortex has disappeared due to a gradual diminishing of its strength, and
2. the wake vortex has disappeared due to a sudden bursting or linking.
In Ref. [3], for the latter an analytical model has been proposed that assumes bursting and
linking to happen in time as a function of some meteorological parameters. To better account
for observed data, in WAVIR the probabilistic bursting and linking period is modeled
independently of the vortex evolution and decay as a stochastic variable with a Rayleigh
density, the mean of which is assumed equal to 50 s. This Rayleigh density is depicted in
Fig. 2 together with empirical data for vortex residence period. This Rayleigh density
modeling also differs significantly from the theoretical probability density model of Kuzmin
[1].
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D.  Wake Vortex Encounter Model
The wake vortex encounter model yields the probability that the wake vortex induced
rolling moment is larger than the maximum control capability – in terms of rolling control
moment – of the encountering aircraft.
The wake vortex control capability model is based on Refs. [1] and [11] and accounts for
the fact that the encountering aircraft tries to compensate for the wake vortex flow field
generated by the leader only. In line with this, the key effect is to reduce the rolling moment
calculated with the wake vortex evolution model. The aircraft control capability model is also
based on Ref. [1] and assumes a value twice as high as the minimal requirement by the
British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (BCAR), which is also adopted by Joint Aviation
Authority (JAA), [12].
It is important to realize that this approach inherently involves an important modeling
assumption: the pilot is not able to anticipate timely on the first signs of a wake vortex. In
practice, a pilot of an encountering aircraft might respond with the immediate initiation of a
missed approach when its aircraft experiences a slight roll upset, i.e., in a very early stage of
a possible wake encounter. Hence, this Kuzmin model is expected to imply a pessimistic
effect on the quantified risk near the threshold.
E. Model Integration and Numerical Evaluation
To assess numerically the wake vortex induced accident risk, the models described in
Sections III.B-III.D are integrated through a stochastic model for wake vortex induced risk
(see Section VI). Based on this model a numerical assessment procedure has been developed,
which is carried out in seven steps:
Step 1: The parameters in the wake vortex evolution model are identified and the
parameter distributions are based on empirical data and/or state-of-the-art literature. In
addition, a set of relevant longitudinal positions x is determined.
Step 2: Run Monte Carlo simulations with the wake vortex evolution model for the case
in which the wake vortex is generated when the leading aircraft has longitudinal position x.
The position, strength, and core radius of the wake vortex are obtained at the time instant that
it has the same longitudinal coordinate as the trailer aircraft. The latter time instant follows
from Monte Carlo simulations with the SIMULATOR tool.
Step 3: The simulation results from Step 2 are analyzed. Based on this analysis, a
dedicated probability density fitting procedure is identified that accounts for dependencies
between the position coordinates, the strength, and the core radius of the wake vortex. The
probability density fitting procedure is carried out and the joint distribution of the wake
vortex position, strength, and core radius is obtained.
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Step 4: Monte Carlo simulations are carried out to simulate the wake vortex encounter. In
this step the joint distribution from Step 3 is used and distributions of the position of the
trailer aircraft obtained with the SIMULATOR tool set are used.
Step 5: Step 5 concerns the numerical evaluation of the wake induced accident risk due to
a wake vortex that is generated when the leading aircraft was at position x.
Step 6: The wake induced accident risk is obtained by maximizing over x the risk
obtained in Step 5.
Step 7: Perform a qualitative evaluation of the influence of the modeling assumptions on
the estimated accident risk.
The results for these seven steps are illustrated for the case of a single runway example,
in Section IV.
F.  Risk Criteria Framework
To judge whether a newly proposed ATM concept is safe or to determine more
appropriate safe separation distances, a suitable metric for quantification of wake vortex
induced risk is required. Up to now several metrics have been used to quantify the risk
imposed by wake vortices, e.g., bank angle, roll angle, roll rate and roll control ratio.
However, because they do not relate to the safety perception of involved interest groups (e.g.,
crew, passengers, controllers, regulators, people living in the airport vicinity), they are felt to
be insufficient. Other possible risk metrics are the risk probability per movement and the risk
probability per year.
In Ref. [13] some initial guidelines are developed for the assessment of safety
requirements. It discusses two possible safety management approaches: the as-low-as-
reasonably-practicable (ALARP) approach and the target level of safety (TLS) approach.
Ranges are suggested from which to adopt a TLS for the risk event probabilities per
movement.
For the adoption of applicable risk criteria, it is clear that policy makers definitively have
to be involved, and also the relation with existing wake vortex induced incident and accident
frequencies should be clearly identified.
G.  From Risk to Safe Separation
By assessing accident risks for various separation distances, one arrives at a curve that
shows the risk as a function of the separation distance between successive aircraft. Figure 3
illustrates how such a curve subsequently maps an ALARP region in terms of risk into one in
terms of separation distances.
-13-
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Figure 3:  Wake vortex risk vs separation distance.
IV. Single Runway Approach
A.  Boeing 737-400 Behind Boeing 747-400
To illustrate the novel wake vortex induced accident risk assessment methodology we
consider a (single) runway, on which a Boeing 737-400 aircraft, which is in the ICAO
medium-weight class, is landing behind a Boeing 747-400 aircraft, which is in the ICAO
heavy-weight class, with controller expected separation distance of 5 n miles when the heavy
is at the threshold. For both aircraft, it is assumed that the approach is instrument landing
system (ILS) Category I.
The landing phase starts at about 20 km before the threshold, and ends at touchdown,
which is 300 m beyond threshold. Figure 4 shows the side view of the runway and glide
slope, where the x-axis is along the runway centerline and positive in runway direction.
Because of its stochastic dynamical modeling basis, the novel wake induced risk
assessment methodology clearly allows to bring the assumptions made to the foreground. For
the example considered, the following main assumptions have been adopted:
1. Long landings (landings far beyond threshold) do not happen.
2. A wake vortex induced accident event is characterized by the wake induced rolling
moment being larger than the aircraft control capability.
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3. A pilot does not respond with the initiation of a missed approach when its aircraft
experiences a slight roll upset.
4. Bursting and linking probabilities are modeled by a Rayleigh density with mean 50 s.
5. There is no head wind, no tail wind and no vertical wind. The wind speed in lateral
direction is normally distributed with expectation 0 and standard deviation 1.5 m/s.
6. There are no wind shear layers.
7. Turbulence of the air is 10% of the wind speed.
In addition to these main assumptions, several other assumptions have been made. It
would go beyond the scope of this paper to list all these assumptions.
Figure 4: Side view of runway and glide slope.
B.  Numerical Results
With support of the SIMULATOR and WAVIR tool sets, the wake vortex induced
accident risk is evaluated for the single runway scenario.
Figures 5 and 6 show data plots of the left vortex for the case that the wake vortex is
generated at 4 km before threshold (cf. output of Step 3 in Section III.E).
Subsequently, Fig. 7 shows the results for the wake induced accident risk resulting from a
wake that is generated at –x km before the threshold. The vertical axis has a logarithmic
scale. The + signs indicate the values of x (cf. output of Step 5 in Section III.E).
Figure 7 shows that the estimated values for the accident risk that is instantaneously
induced by wake vortices along the glide slope decrease from 20 km until approximately 4
km before the threshold. The decrease is due to the descent of the wake and the higher
x = -20 km
3o
Runway
x = 300 m
Touchdown
x = 0 m
THR
ILS path
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navigation precision (in height) of the trailer. At shorter distance from the threshold, the
instantaneous risk increases due to the rebound of wakes near the ground.
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Figure 5: Monte Carlo simulation results of the lateral and vertical coordinate (m) of the
center of the left wake that is generated at 4 km before the threshold.
C.  Qualitative Uncertainty Analysis
A straightforward maximisation over x for the curve in Fig. 7 would lead to an overall
maximum risk at the threshold. However, prior to the maximization one should take into
account that the calculated wake vortex induced accident risk curve may bear significant bias
and/or uncertainty both in positive and negative directions. Usage of such a curve without
taking into consideration existing bias and/or uncertainty can inspire undue conclusions.
To understand the impact of the assumptions on the wake vortex induced risk,
assumptions 1-7 have been analyzed in a qualitative way. The results are given in Table 1.
The first column refers to the assumptions. The second column gives for each assumption the
expected direction of the effect on the wake vortex induced risks (optimistic, pessimistic or
neutral), and the last column gives the expected magnitude (major or significant). A
pessimistic expected direction means that the modeled risk increases due to the assumption.
An optimistic expected direction means that the modeled risk reduces due to the assumption.
A neutral direction means that there exists uncertainty about the direction.
-16-
NLR-TP-2000-280
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
−800
−600
−400
−200
0
200
400
600
800 Configuration exercSR2burst: Strength/lateral data of the left wake at s= all; zclass: stp7
Strength of the left wake
La
te
ra
l p
os
itio
n 
of
 th
e 
le
ft 
wa
ke
Figure 6: Monte Carlo simulation results of the lateral coordinate (m) and the strength (m2/s)
of the center of the left wake that is generated at 4 km before the threshold.
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Figure 7: Estimated values for the severe risk that is instantaneously induced by wake vortex
along the glide slope. The vertical axis has a logarithmic scale.
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Table 1: Expected effects of the main assumptions on assessed risk.
Assumption
Expected direction of effect on wake vortex
induced accident risk Expected magnitude
1 Optimistic Significant
2 Neutral Significant
3 Pessimistic Major
4 Neutral Significant
5 Neutral Significant
6 Optimistic Major
7 Pessimistic Significant
This qualitative analysis has also been applied to all other assumptions. Because their
effect on the wake induced accident risk has been estimated as being either minor or
negligible, these assumptions are not listed in this paper.
D.  Discussion of Results
If one takes into account the impact of the assumptions 1-7 then the curve in Fig. 7 shows
that there are two distinct areas where the instantaneous wake vortex induced accident risks
along the ILS are not negligible:
1. near the threshold, this is due to the ground effect on the wake evolution, and
2. at distances larger than 10 km from the threshold, due to larger ILS navigation errors at
further distances from the threshold.
Near the threshold, the effect of assumption 6 is negligible. Assumption 3 is the only
assumption that has a major impact (pessimistic). The net effect of all assumptions is that the
very right part of the curve in Fig. 7 has a major level of uncertainty with a clear bias in the
pessimistic direction.
At distances larger than 10 km from the threshold, the effect of assumptions 1 and 3 is
negligible. Assumption 6 is the only assumption that has a major impact (optimistic). The net
effect of all assumptions is that the left part of the curve in Fig. 7 has a major level of
uncertainty with a clear bias in the optimistic direction.
The example shows that there are a few directions that specifically deserve the
development of improved wake vortex induced risk models. These directions can be placed in
the following two groups:
1. General modeling is needed to mitigate the need for the neutral and pessimistic
assumptions 2, 3, 4 and 7.
-18-
NLR-TP-2000-280
2. Airport specific modeling is needed to mitigate the need for the neutral and optimistic
assumptions 1, 5 and 6.
V. Concluding Remarks
A.  Probabilistic Approach
This paper has outlined a probabilistic methodology to assess wake vortex induced
accident risks. The aim is to understand the safety evaluation of established separation
standards for current operations, and of new separation standards for new operational concepts
and aircraft designs for busy airports with closely spaced runways.
The probabilistic methodology, the tool sets, and the models initially adopted have been
outlined in Sections II and III respectively. The novelty of this methodology is the
probabilistic integration of the models that are available from the complementary domains that
play a key role in wake vortex risk assessment:
1. wake vortex evolution and decay model [3], [4];
2. fight path evolution model [7], [8];
3. wake vortex encounter model [1], [11]; and
4. risk criteria framework [13].
The probabilistic integration of these submodels has been accomplished through first
developing an integral stochastic model (see Section VI), and subsequently using this to
develop a hierarchical Monte Carlo simulation scheme (see Section III.E).
Subsequently, in Section IV, illustrative numerical results of the methodology are given
for a Boeing 737-400 aircraft landing on a single runway behind a Boeing 747-400 aircraft,
with expected separation distance of 5 n miles at the threshold. The numerical and
complementary qualitative results obtained for this example clearly show that the
methodology is able to identify the key bottlenecks in developing advanced wake vortex
procedures. In the current situation, the safety of the established operations is insufficiently
understood in a few key areas. Most of these areas ask for general modeling effort. A few
areas only ask for airport specific modeling effort.
B.  General Modeling Areas
There are four key general modeling areas that deserve significant modeling effort. A
relatively simple one is to improve the probabilistic modeling of navigation performance and
long landing models under different navigation modes and various wind conditions. The basis
for this activity is one of collecting statistical data of aircraft navigation performance.
The second area is to improve the modeling of autopilot reactions to wake induced roll
upset, and missed approaches initiated by pilots as a reaction to experiencing a roll upset
-19-
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during the ILS approach. The basis for this activity seems to be one of analyzing pilot
incident reports on missed approaches. In addition, flight simulation data should be used to
develop models that represent the pilot behavior during wake vortex encounter.
The third area is to improve the modeling of bursting and linking phenomena. Because of
the existing uncertainty about bursting and linking, and their dependency on weather
condition, it is strongly recommended to model bursting and linking with appropriate
probability distributions. The distributions are to be validated with real experiments or state-
of-the-art computational fluid dynamic models for wake vortex evolution.
The fourth area is the further development of a risk management framework for wake
vortex induced accident and incident risks such that it becomes clearly connected to existing
wake vortex incident and accident data. This modeling effort can only be concluded in
discussions with regulatory authorities and other relevant interest groups (e.g., pilots and
controllers). In the current European constellation, this process still is very much airport
specific.
C.  Airport Specific Modeling Areas
The key airport specific modeling area that deserves significant modeling effort is
weather. It is important to realize the major influence of specific weather conditions, in
particular wind fields, turbulence, stable stratification, and wind shear [14]. These weather
conditions are so airport specific that the developed models have to be tuned for the airport
under consideration.
Another key airport specific modeling issue is that each particular airport runway
geometry may lead to all kinds of dependencies between runway usage. The particular
geometry of an airport layout often leads to airport specific dependencies that involve
combinations of wake vortex induced accident risks and risk of collision with another
aircraft.
It should also be taken into account that, due to these airport specific modeling needs,
different appropriate and safe separation distances might result for different airports.
D. Ongoing Developments
The results obtained so far form a clear motivation to continue the development of the
TOPAZ/WAVIR methodology toward the assessment of wake vortex induced accident and
incident risks. The results obtained with the methodology in its current state already provide
clear overall insight into the large variety of wake vortex subproblems.
Apart from the single runway example illustrated in this paper, also a closely spaced
runway example has been evaluated with the TOPAZ/WAVIR methodology (this was under
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a study contract with the DFS). This study also provided valuable overall insight into the
wake vortex subproblems in case of parallel flying aircraft.
Since January 2000, the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR is leading a major three-
year project [named Assessment of Wake Vortex Safety (S-WAKE)] for the European
Commission in which key European wake vortex experts are collaborating to develop
solutions for the outstanding modeling areas
VI.  Appendix: Stochastic Wake Vortex Model
A.  Introduction
This appendix presents the stochastic model that has been developed to allow the
integration of the wake vortex submodels from the various domains. We assume a situation
of a sequence of aircraft which fly on parallel tracks toward multiple closely spaced parallel
runways. For the position and velocity components of aircraft i, this means there is a well
defined stochastic process { }itititititit zyxzyx     ,,,,,  for the three-dimensional position and speed
components of aircraft i's state. In addition, this means that there is a well-defined stochastic
process { }i tzi tyi tx www ,,, ,,  for the wind speed components acting locally on aircraft i.
For the evaluation of the wake vortex induced risk, it is necessary to present an
appropriate stochastic dynamical model characterization of the wake vortex induced incident
and accident risks. This is done as follows. In subsection B, we present a causal stochastic
model for the wake vortex random field. Subsequently, in subsection C, we extend this with a
stochastic model for the wake vortex induced roll moment for the following aircraft, together
with a model for the compensation of this roll moment. Next, in subsection D, we use our
stochastic dynamical model to present a model for the wake vortex induced risk.
B. Wake Vortex Random Field Model
The left and right centres of the vortex at moment s which are generated by aircraft j at
moment t, are represented by the two parameter random fields δ  j− (t,s) and δ  j+ (t,s), with s ≥
0, each of which assumes (y,z) values in IR2. At moment t+s, the strengths of the left and right
vortices that are generated by aircraft j at moment t are represented by the two parameter
random fields γ  j− (t,s) and γ  j+ (t,s), each of which assumes strength values in IR.
To shorten our notation in the sequel, we place the above components into a joint IR6 -
valued random field ν j(t,s):
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }ststststst jjjjj ,,,,,,,column, +−+−∆= γγδδν
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Research is ongoing to develop differential equations for the motion and decay of the
components of the joint random field ν j(t,s). Widely known equations in current literature are
the ones given by Ref. [3], which are largely based on those of Refs. [15] and [16]. When
adding a straightforward extension for non-zero wind velocity in z direction, these equations
are of the form:
( ) ( ) ( )( )sstf
sd
std jjj κνν ,,, =
with κ jt (s) denoting local external influences such as the local cross-wind w jy,t and the local
vertical wind w jz,t at moment t, the drag coefficient C jD of j's "wake oval", the local Brünt-
Väisälä frequency N j(t+s), and the RMS velocity of atmospheric turbulence q j(t+s).
To uniquely define the solution of the latter differential equation for s ≥ 0, we have to
characterize the components of ν j(t,0). From Refs. [5] and [17], we know
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with b j0 the initial spacing between the primary vortex centres, m j the mass of aircraft j, g
the gravitational acceleration, and ρ jt the local air density.
Next we have to characterize the moment in time that a wake generated at longitudinal
position x by aircraft j will arrive at the longitudinal position of aircraft i. To do so we assume
that the velocity in longitudinal direction of the wind acting on the wake is constant. Then
that moment in time is a stopping time τ ijx, which is defined by:
{ }j
x
i
s
j
x
ij
x j
x
j
x
wsxxs
s
ττ
ττ
,
0inf +=>+=
+
with
{ }xxt
t
j
t
j
x =≡ infτ .
By the very nature of the situation we consider, the airspeeds of both aircraft in x
direction are bounded and either both strictly positive or both strictly negative. In view of
this, the latter equation this means that {τ ijx} is a strictly increasing continuous process.
Hence, we can define an IR6-valued stochastic process {ν ijt} to represent the actual
contribution to aircraft i of the wake vortex generated by aircraft j, as follows:( )jxijxjxjijij
x
τττνν
τ
−≡ ,
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Our next step is to characterize how the latter stochastic process {ν ijt} induces a rolling
moment process {µ ijt} for aircraft i.
C.  Induced Roll Moment and Compensation Model
For the characterization of how the vortex stochastic process {ν ijt} induces a rolling
moment process {µ ijt} for aircraft i, we adopt the approximate model developed by Ref. [1]
for a rectangular wing. Then the non-dimensionalized induced rolling moment satisfies:
( ){ } ( ) 1
,,
,,,,max
2
−±±
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j
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j
t
j
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iiiijij
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i
ij wxrbzyf
b
C
ij
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ij
x
ij
x
ij
x
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ij
x

τττττ
α
τ
δγ
π
µ
with C αi the lift curve slope of aircraft i (assuming values between 1.4 and 1.6), b i is i's wing
span, j
core ijx
r
τ,
 is the radius of the vortex core generated by j at longitudinal position x and
arriving at moment τ ijx at the longitudinal position of aircraft i, while f satisfies:
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Based on the Corjon and Poinsot models, we adopt the following characterization for the
vortex core radius:
( ) −Γ= jxijxjjcorejcore jxijx rr ττττ ,08010,, ,max
with j
core
r 0,  the initial radius of aircraft j's vortex cores.
We get
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In Kuzmin [Ref. [1], Eq (3.3)] also gives a characterization of the maximum non-
dimensionalized rolling moment ij
xτ
µ
max,
 for which it is possible to compensate for by
aircraft i
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with the maximum steady roll rate p
 max assumed to be twice as large as the roll rate p REQ
minimal required by the British Civil Airworthiness Requirements:
REQmax 2 pp =
with
1BCAR
BCAR
REQ
−
=
T
p
φ
where φ
 BCAR and T BCAR are specified by the British Civil Airworthiness Requirements
(BCAR) and by JAA [12] to satisfy π/3 and 7 seconds, respectively (i.e., a roll over 60 deg
from 30 deg is required to be possible within 7 seconds). Thus p
 REQ ≈ 0.175 s-1.
As long as the vortex induced rolling moment and downwash can be compensated, there
will be no reason for a vortex induced accident. Thus it is reasonable to assume that there is
no triggering of a rolling induced accident as long as
ij
x
ij
x
ij
ττ
µµ
max,
≤
Through substitution of our characterizations for the right and left terms in this inequality,
and subsequent evaluation, we get
( ){ } ( )2REQ3,,,,,max ijcoreiiiijij bprbzyf ijxijxijxijxijx πτττττ δγ ≤
±
±±
Thus our test on the possibility to compensate the wake vortex induced rolling moment at
a time-moment simplifies to
1≤ijij
xτ
ξ
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ij
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ij
x
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rbzyfbp
τττττ
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,
12
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±±
−
±
≡
A similar expression for compensation of downwash is not available in this initial model.
D.  Induced Risk Model
The risk measures to be characterized are:
1. Probability p ijI of an incident for i, induced by j's wake.
2. Probability p ijA of an accident for i, induced by j's wake.
3. Probability p ijC  of a crash of i into terrain, induced by j's wake.
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We start the characterization for accident risk. As long as ξ ijt assumes values on the
interval [-1,1] then at moment t the vortex induced rolling moment can be compensated, and
there will be no reason for a vortex induced accident. Thus

 >∃≡ 1Pr ijtijA tp ξ
In terms of probability at moment t we define
( ) { }1Pr >≡ ijtijA tp ξ
Evaluation yields
( ) ( ) { } ( ) '''1Pr1
0
1
1
zdzpzzdptp i
t
ij
t z
i
t
ij
t
ij
A ∫∫
∞
−
<>=−= ξξξξ
where ( )ξξ ijtp  denotes the density of ξ 
ij
t.
This means we have the following upper bound characterization for p ijA
( )tp
t
pp ijA
ij
A
ij
A maxˆ ≡≤
Because aircraft i and j are flying into the same direction, both {ξ ijt} and p ijA (t) have
local peaks which are rather flat. This implies that our upper bound characterization also is a
rather accurate approximation, thus:
ij
A
ij
A pp ˆ≈
Our subsequent characterization for incidents follows from a similar approach. As long as
ξ ijt assumes values on the interval [-ε,ε], then at moment t the vortex induced rolling moment
will not be noticed as being largely uncomfortably for a certain value of ε, and there will be
no reason to speak of a vortex induced incident. Thus

 >∃≡ εξ ijtijI tp Pr
In terms of probability at moment t and its upper bound, this yields
( ) ( ) { } ( ) '''Pr1
0
zdzpzzdptp i
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t z
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ij
t
ij
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( )tp
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ij
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ij
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Again, because aircraft i and j are flying into the same direction, both {ξ ijt} and p ijI (t)
have local peaks which are rather flat. This implies that our upper bound characterization also
is a rather accurate approximation, thus
ij
I
ij
I pp ˆ≈
Finally, our characterization for crashes becomes

 <>∃≡ iitijtijC zztp min,1Pr ξ
where z imin is a random variable, assuming a Weibull probability density function
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with parameters κ ≥ 1 and z inom >0.
Next, similar as before we define
( ) { }iitijtijC zztp min,1Pr <>≡ ξ
by which we get
( )tp
t
pp ijC
ij
C
ij
C maxˆ ≡≤
with z imin the minimal height above ground level at which an escape from a crash is possible
for an aircraft of type η
 i. Straightforward evaluation yields
( ) { } ( ) ( )dzzpdzzpzztp ii
t zz
z
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0 0
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It should be noted that from an incident point of view, the critical moment in time is:
( )t
t
pt ijI
ij
I maxargˆ =
From an accident point of view, the critical moment in time is:
( )t
t
pt ijA
ij
A maxargˆ =
From a crash-into-terrain point of view, the critical moment in time is:
( )t
t
pt ijC
ij
C maxargˆ =
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In general, one could expect significant differences between realizations of these three
moments in time. In this paper, simulation results for the accident risk characterization have
been given.
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